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BANKRUPTCY LAW-Matching the Historic Legal
Principles of New Mexico's Exemption Laws to the
Modern Identity of Annuities: Doha Ana Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Dofflemeyer
I.

INTRODUCTION

1
In Doha Ana Savings & Loan Ass'n, F.A. v. Dofflemeyer (DASL),
the New Mexico Supreme Court held that statutorily exempt annuities
are not automatically protected from creditor attachment. 2 The decision
grants creditors the opportunity to challenge a debtor's transfer of nonexempt funds into annuities' that ordinarily would be exempt. 4 The
court found that in order for a creditor to execute a judgment on annuities
presumed exempt from attachment, the creditor must prove, in accordance
with the Uniform Fraudulent 6 Transfer Act (UFTA),' that the debtor
intended to defraud creditors.
The DASL decision is significant for what it does not do. The court's
analysis of the purposes of New Mexico's exemption statutes is cursory,
inhibiting a workable construction of the statutes. Furthermore, the court
confines its analysis for determining whether annuities are exempt to the
subjective task of discovering the debtor's intent. As a result, the door
remains open for abuse of the exemption provisions, for legal confusion,
and for ad hoc court action regarding the validity of the transfer of
nonexempt funds into exempt annuities.
This Note will examine the purposes underlying New Mexico's exemption
statutes and the consequences of the court's failure to reconcile the modern

I. 115 N.M. 590, 855 P.2d 1054 (1993).
2. Id. at 594, 855 P.2d at 1058 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-10-2 to -3 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-10-2 to -3 protect retirement and pension funds, annuities, and the
proceeds from life, accident, and health insurance for persons supporting only themselves.
Any mention in this note of "exemption statutes" or "exemption provisions" refers to N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 42-10-2- to -3.
3. An annuity is a fund which "designates a right to receive fixed, periodic payments, either
for life or for a term of years." Moore v. O'Cheskey, 87 N.M. 66, 66-67, 529 P.2d 292, 292-93
(Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 48, 529 P.2d 274 (1974). The term "annuities" refers to
all annuities, of any type and for any amount.
4. DASL, 115 N.M. at 594, 855 P.2d at 1058.
5. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-10-14 to -25 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
Especially pertinent to this note is § 56-10-18.
The UIFTA is a revision of the Uniform Conveyance Act. UFTA replaced "conveyance" with
"transfer" in recognition of the Act's applicability to transfers of personal as well as real property.
Sections 56-10-18 to -19 of New Mexico's UFTA are essentially a recodification of §§ 56-10-4 & 7 of New Mexico's Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. DASL, 115 N.M. at 593, 855 P.2d at
1057.
See generally Michael L. Cook & Richard E. Mendales, UFTA: An Introductory Critique, 62
Am. BAN KR. L.J. 92 (1988); Frank Kennedy, The UFTA, 18 UCC L.J. 195 (1986); Peter A. Alces
& Luther M. Dorr, Jr., A Critical Analysis of the New Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, U. ILL.
L. REv. 527 (1985).
For a further analysis of the court's reference to UFTA see discussion infra part IV.
6. DASL, 115 N.M. at 593, 855 P.2d at 1057.
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conditions of annuities with the historic purposes of the exemption laws.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Dofia Ana Savings and Loan (plaintiff) obtained a writ of execution
against Mr. Dofflemeyer. 7 At the time of this case, Dofflemeyer was
seventy-seven years old and retired from self-employment. 8 Dofflemeyer
returned the writ to plaintiff, listing a certificate of deposit in the amount
of $54,000. However, before plaintiff could garnish this asset, Dofflemeyer
liquidated the certificate of deposit and used the proceeds to purchase
one annuity. Dofflemeyer then sold some real estate to his sister and
purchased a second annuity with the proceeds. The record indicates that
Dofflemeyer purchased the two annuities in contemplation of bankruptcy
and his need for an immediate source of monthly income. Dofflemeyer
named his sister as beneficiary of both annuities.
Plaintiff held deficiency judgments against Dofflemeyer and attempted
to garnish Dofflemeyer's two annuities to satisfy the judgments. In state
district court, Dofflemeyer claimed the two annuities were exempt from
attachment under sections 42-10-2 and -3 of the New Mexico statutes.
The district court agreed, dismissed plaintiff's writ of garnishment, and
granted Dofflemeyer summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed. The New
Mexico Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment and remanded
the case to the district court to resolve whether Dofflemeyer fraudulently
transferred his nonexempt funds into exempt annuities.9 Chief Justice
Ransom dissented, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to raise
a genuine issue of material fact that Dofflemeyer intended to misuse the
exemption statutes. Justice Ransom reasoned that because Dofflemeyer
was an elderly man and his annuities gave him a monthly income of no
more than necessary for his financial independence, Dofflemeyer's annuities were for the purpose of his retirement and, therefore, properly
exempt. 10
III.

ANALYSIS

The New Mexico Supreme Court looked beyond the plain meaning of
the exemption statutes' language to the purposes of the legislation." The
court held that the objective of the exemption statutes is to protect the
funds named in the statutes so long as fraud is not committed against

7. Id. at 591, 855 P.2d at 1055. Unless cited, all subsequent references to the facts of this
case refer to this citation.
8. Id. at 595, 855 P.2d at 1059 (Ransom, C.J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 594, 855 P.2d at 1058.
10. Id. at 595, 855 P.2d at 1059 (Ransom, C.J., dissenting).
The case has not progressed after remand because immediately prior to the appellate issuance of
the DASL decision, Dofflemeyer died. Because Dofflemeyer listed his sister as beneficiary of the
annuities in dispute, plaintiff's attorneys brought Dofflemeyer's sister into the suit. Plaintiff has
also joined the two annuity companies that issued Dofflemeyer's annuities.
11. Id. at 591, 855 P.2d at 1056.
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creditors.' 2 The DASL court stressed that in New Mexico it is not
fraudulent per se for a debtor to transfer nonexempt funds into exempt
annuities on the eve of bankruptcy or threatened execution by a creditor,
as Dofflemeyer did.' 3 Rather, the transfer of nonexempt property to
exempt4 funds in contemplation of bankruptcy is merely an indication of
fraud. '
The court directed practitioners and courts to use UFTA to determine
whether a transfer of nonexempt funds into exempt funds, specifically
annuities, is voidable.' 5 Thus, concerned about the clash between debtors'
interests and creditors' interests inherent in a combined application of
the exemption statutes and UFTA, the court's goal in its statutory cona harmonious coupling of debt exemption and
struction was to render
6
creditor protection.
The Misplaced Focus of the Court's Statutory Interpretation
In attempting to harmonize the exemption statutes with UFTA, the
DASL court shifted the focus of annuity-exemption analysis away from
satisfying the objectives of exemption statutes. Consequently, the court
overlooked the initial step of statutory interpretation which entails meshing
the traditional purposes of the exemption statutes with modern financial
circumstances. In the analysis of annuity-exemptions, courts should con' 7
strue the statutes' historic application to annuities in light of the "modern '
use of annuities. Such an analysis would provide guidelines that make
reference to UFTA unnecessary in many annuity-exemption cases.
The language of New Mexico's exemption statutes is not ambiguous.
"[A]ny interest in or proceeds from a pension or retirement fund of
every person supporting only himself is exempt from ... attachment,
execution or foreclosure by a judgment creditor."' 8 Furthermore:
A.

The cash surrender value of any life insurance policy . . . annuity
contract ... or payments of every kind from any life, accident or
health insurance policy, annuity contract or deposit . . . issued upon
the life of a citizen or resident of the state of New Mexico ... shall
in no case be liable to attachment, garnishment or legal process in
favor of any creditor of the person whose life is so insured or who
is protected by said contract .... 9

12. DASL, 115 N.M. at 592-93, 855 P.2d at 1056-57.
13. Id. at 594, 855 P.2d at 1058; see also In re Zouhar, 10 B.R. 154, 156 (Bankr. D.N.M.
1981) (transfers on the eve of bankruptcy are not per se fraudulent conversions).
14. DASL, 115 N.M. at 594, 855 P.2d at 1058.
15. Id.
16. "Our statutes were not meant to be construed in isolation, but in conjunction with the
general body of the law as a whole." See id. at 593, 855 P.2d at 1057.
17. This Note will discuss how annuities in the late 20th century have broad and diverse purposes
and do not always act as insurance contracts. Currently, annuities are popularly regarded as "hot"
investments. See Ellen E. Schultz, Variable Annuities Provide the Choices of Mutual Funds, Plus
Some Tax Breaks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1993, at Cl.
18. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-10-2 (Cum. Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).

19. Id. § 42-10-3 (emphasis added).
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Thus, when read together, sections 42-10-2 and -3 provide an unlimited
amount of exemption for retirement and pension funds, payments from
life, accident, and health insurance, and all annuity contracts. 20
Nevertheless, when the transferred funds do not comport with the
underlying purposes of the exemption statutes, the public interest in
preserving equitable economic relationships between debtors and creditors
is transgressed. 2' Thus, the issue DASL presented mandates more than
the court's cursory analysis of New Mexico's exemption statutes in order
to yield a workable and enduring annuity-exemption analysis.
1. Purposes of Exemption Statutes
The purpose of exemption statutes is not to grant all annuities unlimited
protection from any creditor attachment; nor do the statutes purport to
allow a person to shelter assets from his creditors. 22 Rather, exemption
statutes seek to advance five main objectives:
1. to provide the debtor with property necessary for his physical
survival;
2. to protect the dignity of the debtor;
3. to enable the debtor to rehabilitate himself financially and earn
income in the future;
4. to protect the debtor's family from the adverse consequences of
impoverishment; and
5. to shift the burden of providing the debtor and his family with
the minimal financial support from society to the debtor's creditors. 23
The New Mexico Legislature originally enacted New Mexico's exemption
statutes in 18872 in order to implement humane social policy. 25 New

20. See also In re Zouhar, 10 Bankr. 154 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981) (New Mexico case law interprets
the exemptions statutes to permit unlimited exemptions with respect to insurance and to pension
and retirement plans).
21. Courts have found that the legislative protection of debtors through unlimited exemptions
from creditor attachment for life insurance, annuities, and pension funds, is a constitutional discrimination against the rights of creditors. See Cooper v. Taylor, 54 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 286 U.S. 554 (1932) (finding it constitutional for the Florida legislature to exempt the cash
surrender value from insured's creditors' claims); see also Addiss v. Selig, 264 N.Y.S. 816, aff'd,
266 N.Y.S. 1008, rev'd on other grounds, 190 N.E. 490 (N.Y. 1933) (the fact that an exemption
statute diminished the rights of creditors does not invalidate the act).
Because all states shield debtors from potential destitution by keeping certain assets beyond the
reach of creditors, the preservation of economic equity is complicated. Nonetheless, it is an economic
necessity for creditors to have an effective collection method because lack of legitimate collection
leads to higher rates and reduced availability of credit. See Alan N. Resnick, Prudent Planning or
Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt Assets to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on
the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 RUTGERS L. Rv. 615, 615 n.2 (1978).
22. New Mexico Nat'l Bank v. Brooks, 9 N.M. 113, 49 P. 947 (1897) ("[lit was never intended
that these generous provisions [New Mexico's exemption statutes) should be prostituted to the
encouragement of extravagance, and the evasion of just indebtedness by indulgence in luxurious
living.").
23. Resnick, supra note 21, at 621.
24. 1887 N.M. Laws, ch. 37.
25. See, e.g., Hewatt v. Clark, 44 N.M. 453, 103 P.2d 646 (1940); In re Assignment of Spitz
Bros., 8 N.M. 622, 45 P. 1122 (1896) (Exemptions protect debtor's necessities and guard against
familial destitution.); New Mexico Nat'l Bank v. Brooks, 9 N.M. 113, 49 P. 947 (1887); Ruybalid
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Mexico courts have consistently found that the exemption statutes seek
to "protect families from becoming destitute as the result of misfortune
through common debts which are generally unforeseen .... ,,,6 New
Mexico case law has sought to construe the language of the exemption
statutes in harmony with the purpose of the statutes. 27 Other jurisdictions
also have found that the overriding purpose of exemption statutes is to
insure a means of livelihood to the debtor and his family and prevent
them, through the loss of basic necessities, from becoming the state's
charge. 28 If the DASL court had thoroughly analyzed the social objectives
of the exemption statutes when determining whether Dofflemeyer's annuities were exempt, the court might have concluded that either the
annuity provisions in the exemption statutes need modernization in the
form of legislative reform; or, a contemporary interpretation of the
exemption statutes' purposes 29 would necessarily limit exempt annuities
to those 3annuities which fulfill the social policy objectives of the exemption
statutes . 0
Times Have Changed: An 1887 Annuity Is Not a 1994 Annuity
The term "annuity" appeared in the first promulgation of the life
insurance exemption statute in 1887. 3 The legislature has never amended
B.

v. Segura, 107 N.M. 660, 666, 763 P.2d 369, 375 (Ct. App. 1988).
Although some of the terms of New Mexico's exemption statutes have evolved and been amended
in response to judicial and social considerations, no alteration of the exemption provisions' underlying
policy can be discovered in New Mexico case law. See Hewatt, 44 N.M. 453, 103 P.2d 646 (rejecting
argument that legislative amendments indicated change in underlying policy of the statutes). Therefore,
it is logical to conclude contemporary courts should adhere to the same purposes espoused historically.
26. Tomson v. Lerner, 37 N.M. 546, 549, 25 P.2d 209, 210-11 (1933); see also D'Avignon v.
Graham, 113 N.M. 129, 137, 823 P.2d 929, 937 (1991) ("Exemption laws were enacted to protect
the head of a household and his dependents from the harsh vicissitudes of poor fiscal decisionmaking.").
27. "The language of the [New Mexico exemption] act should be construed in harmony with
its humane and remedial purpose." Spitz Bros., 8 N.M. at 628, 45 P. at 1123.
28. See, e.g., Mahone v. Mahone, 517 P.2d 131 (Kan. 1973) (purpose and policy of Kansas
exemption laws is to protect the unfortunate debtor and his family from economic destitution);
Karzina v. Kelsey, 262 S.W.2d 844 (Mo. 1953) (the purpose of a homestead exemption is the
safekeeping of the home for the householder, widow, and minor children by making it unobtainable
to creditors); Thorsby v. Babcock, 222 P.2d 863 (Cal. 1950) (the object of homestead exemption
legislation is to provide for the debtor's family and protect their home from creditors); Poznanovic
v. Maki, 296 N.W. 415, 417 (Minn. 1941) ("the humane and enlightened purpose of an exemption
statute is to protect a debtor and his family against absolute want by allowing them" some reasonable
means of support); In re Welch, 8 F. Supp. 838 (D.N.D. 1934) (purpose of exemption statutes is
to provide for care of dependents).
For a list of every state's exemption statutes see 7 WILLIAM M7. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
(Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1993).
29. Although exemption statutes are generally liberally construed, see Spitz Bros., 8 N.M. at
628, 45 P. 1123, liberal construction does not signal an abandonment of regard for the exemption
statutes' purposes. Indeed, the Spitz Bros. court stated that the liberal construction is granted "so
as to promote the policy on which they [exemption statutes) are based, and accomplish the purposes
to which they are directed. Id. at 628, 45 P. at 1123. Hence, if the objectives of certain annuities
do not conform to the goals of the exemption statutes, courts are not disregarding the historically
liberal construction; rather, courts are acting with respect for the legislature's. intent and the social
objectives of the exemption statutes.
30. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
31. 1887 N.M. Laws, ch. 37.
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the exemption statute to define the types of annuities properly exempt
nor has the legislature placed a limit on the amount of money that can
be placed in an exempt annuity.3 2 In contrast, the use of annuities in
America has changed. 3 In the one-hundred seven years since section 4210-3 first exempted all annuity contracts, annuities have been largely

4
transformed from insurance-type contracts into tax-sheltered investments .
35
Today, annuities are primarily used as tax-deferred investment vehicles.
The dramatic change in the use of annuities affects the exemption statutes'
application in modern annuity-exemption cases like DASL.

C. Only Certain Annuities Conform to the Framework of the
Exemption Statutes
Noting that the district court did not determine whether Dofflemeyer's

annuities were exempt, the supreme court stated that it would decide
whether the annuities were exempt under New Mexico's exemption statutes.16 Nevertheless, the supreme court dodged the crux of proper annuityexemption analysis by neglecting to ask: are Dofflemeyer's annuities the

kinds of annuities the exemption statutes intend to excuse from attachment?
Although retirement/pension funds and life insurance proceeds are
exempted by different statutory provisions, the historical purpose and

social policy underlying sections 42-10-2 and -3 is the same.3 7 It logically
follows that annuities, included in the same exemption provisions as life
insurance and retirement funds, should have the "character" of life
insurance or retirement funds to be consonant with the statute's underlying
policy. Exempt annuities should be restricted to exempting comparable
economic necessities as retirement plans and life insurance, which prevent

debtors and their families from economic dependence on the public dole. 8
Many present-day annuities have dubious relationships to the purposes

of the exemption statutes.

32. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-10-3 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
33. See Schultz, supra note 17.
34. Id. Indeed, brokerage houses advertise annuities as one of the best ways for the middle and
upper classes to minimize the impact of the new taxes created by President Clinton's Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. See KEMPER SECURITIES, INSIGHTS 1-2 (1993) (annuities are listed
as a "tax-advantaged investment strategy").
35. Schultz, supra note 17. Also significant to the changing role of annuities in the American
financial scene is the introduction of the income tax. When the New Mexico legislature enacted the
exemption provisions in 1887, there was no federal income tax. In 1913, Congress passed the Sixteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, granting Congress the power to levy an income tax.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. Under America's current tax structure, annuities enjoy a certain tax
benefit pursuant to the exclusion ratio outlined in the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 72(b) (1986).
Because annuities aid tax avoidance their character has been, in large part, transformed from
insurance contracts to hot investment plans.
36. DASL, 115 N.M. at 592, 855 P.2d at 1056.
37. Resnick, supra note 21, at 621. Retirement and life insurance are exempted by different
statutory provisions probably because the concept of retirement came later than life insurance and,
therefore, was added to our laws as a different provision. Because the retirement and life insurance
exemption statutes exist side-by-side in N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-10-2 to -3, and serve similar purposes,
it is reasonable to view the two statutes as akin to one another.
38. See Resnick, supra note 21, at 621.
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1. Not All Annuities Carry the Purpose of Life Insurance
Plaintiff contended that Dofflemeyer's intent when he purchased his
annuities was not to obtain life insurance, but "to shield investment
income from Dofia Ana Savings ... [which] was seeking to collect its
deficiency judgment." 3 9 Dofflemeyer purchased an "immediate type"
annuity designed to provide him with current monthly income.4 Based
on the absence of insurance-type provisions in Dofflemeyer's annuity
contracts and the selling broker's description of the annuity as an investment vehicle, 4' plaintiff argued that "Dofflemeyer's resort to the
exemption provisions protecting life insurance is misplaced.' '42
Instead of taking this opportunity to apply the facts of this case to
the purposes of exemption statutes, the New Mexico Supreme Court
focused on discovering whether the debtor acted with fraudulent intent
43
toward his creditors and introduced an unnecessary reference to UFTA.
Thus, the decision failed to focus on whether the character of the annuities
was consonant with the life insurance exemption provisions.
2. Not All Annuities are Retirement or Pension Funds
Plaintiff contended that the classification of Dofflemeyer's annuities
as retirement funds was merely "convenient nomenclature.""4 Dofflemeyer's annuities did not spring from a retirement plan or from wages
arising under an employment relationship.4 5 Rather, Dofflemeyer purchased his annuities with money raised through a real estate transaction
and liquidating a certificate of deposit.4 The facts suggested Dofflemeyer
needed the income from the annuities to maintain his economic independence.4 Nevertheless, unlike retirement pensions, Dofflemeyer would
have been able to cash in his annuities and get his money back.
Prior to 1988, Minnesota's exemption law was similar to New Mexico's
exemption law in that it did not define the type of annuity the statute
exempted or the amount an annuity could exempt." In In re Raymond,4 9
the Minnesota court found that the Minnesota Legislature intended to
exempt only those assets derived directly from an employment relationship
or from self-employment endeavors. 0 The Raymond court, looking for
an understanding of modern annuities, turned to federal law for guidance. 5 Under federal law, terms used in retirement exemption provisions

39. Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 12, DASL, 115 N.M. 590, 855 P.2d 1054 (1993) (No. 20561).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See DASL, 115 N.M. at 594, 855 P.2d at 1058. A further analysis of the court's reference
to UFTA appears in the discussion infra part IV.
44. Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 19, DASL, 115 N.M. 590, 855 P.2d 1054 (1993) (No. 20561).
45. See DASL, 115 N.M. at 591, 855 P.2d at 1055.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id. at 595, 855 P.2d at 1059 (Ransom, C.J., dissenting).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(24) (West 1988).
71 B.R. 628 (D. Minn. 1987).
Id. at 630.
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1988)).
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"require wages to be earned to allow plan contributions by an employer
and/or employee and/or self-employed person."3' 2 Thus, the Raymond
court reasoned that annuity contracts or contributions must be tied to
an employment relationship before they can become exempt under Minnesota law." Following the Raymond court's decision, the Minnesota
Legislature, in 1988, amended Minnesota's exemption statute to limit
annuity funds to earnings, and to limit the amount that can be exempted.5
Dofflemeyer did not purchase his annuities with money directly tied
to his employment wages, nor did Dofflemeyer purchase his annuities
with profits directly from his self-employment." Dofflemeyer never indicated that the funds he used to purchase the annuities were part of a
designated, cognizable fund.56 Rather, Dofflemeyer derived his money
from two separate transactions which were wholly unrelated to his employment.
The DASL court chose not to recognize the importance of establishing
a connection between the character of an annuity and the purpose of
the exemption statutes. "We do not adopt [plaintiff's] view that Dofflemeyer's annuity funds must originate from some designated employment-related retirement or pension fund to qualify for exemption under
§ 42-10-2." 57 After DASL, the exemption statutes are applicable to all
funds the debtor designates as retirement funds without regard for the
objective character of the funds or whether the funds were derived from
employment-related activities.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The court's suggestion to use UFTA to determine if exempt annuities
are valid is not necessarily helpful.5" UFTA offers a nonexhaustive list
of factors which are meant to help courts objectively determine if the

52. Raymond, 71 B.R. at 630.
53. Id.
54. The 1988 amendments are as follows:
(1) to the extent the plan or contract is described in section 401(a), 403, 408,
or 457 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 U.S.C.A. §§ 401, 403, 408, and
4571, as amended, or payments under the plan or contract are or will be rolled
over as provided in section 402(a)(5), 403(b)(8), or 408(d)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended; or
(2) to the extent of the debtor's aggregate interest under all plans and contracts
up to a present value of $30,000 and additional amounts under all the plans and
contracts to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any
spouse or dependent of the debtor.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(24)(1)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1993).
Such legislative revision is one route New Mexico could take to prevent abuse of and confusion
about its exemption statutes. See infra part V.
55. DASL, 115 N.M. at 591, 855 P.2d at 1055.
56. See id.
57. DASL, 115 N.M. at 594, 855 P.2d at 1058.
58. See id. at 593, 855 P.2d at 1057.
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debtor made a transfer with actual intent to defraud creditors. 9 The
weight a court should give the various factors on UFTA's "intent list"
is undefined. UFTA acts only as a balancing device to which the court
can add its own variables and designate the importance of the variables
at its discretion. Hence, UFTA may not be a well-suited test for finding
fraud in the application of the exemption statutes.
Due to the myopic nature of the DASL opinion, questions persist: are
the "funds" a debtor uses to purchase annuities on the eve of bankruptcy
unrestricted by the objectives of the exemption provisions? If the debtor
himself classifies these "funds" as retirement/pension plans should courts
automatically recognize the funds as exempt "retirement funds"? Finally,
is there any limit to the amount that an annuity can exempt from creditor
attachment?
The social policy which underlies exemption statutes limits the amount
that can be exempt from creditor attachment to what is necessary for
the basic economic survival of the debtor and his family.6w Yet, New
Mexico's exemption provisions state no explicit value or quantity limits
for annuities. 6' Such generosity can lead to abuse of the statutes:
[tihe obsolescence and open-endedness of many state exemption laws
enable debtors to keep property beyond the reach of creditors when
no justifiable social policy is served and when creditors are thereby62
unduly restricted in their attempts to obtain payment of their claims.
Indeed, one bankruptcy judge noted that the unlimited exemptions with
respect to insurance, retirement, and pension plans the New Mexico
statutes 3 permit "presents the potential for abuse of legitimate exemp6
tions."
The majority opinion failed to address the amount of money Dofflemeyer transferred into exempt annuities." Justice Ransom's dissenting

59. UFTA's criteria to analyze "actual intent" include:
1. the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
2. the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the
transfer;
3. the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
4. before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor has been
sued or threatened with suit;
5. the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
6. the debtor absconded;
7. the debtor removed or concealed assets;
8. the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;
9. the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made
or the obligation was incurred;
10. the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was
incurred; and
II. the debtor transferred the essential asset of the business to a lienor who
transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-10-18(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
60. Resnick, supra note 21, at 621.
61. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-10-2 & 42-10-3 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
62. Resnick, supra note 21, at 628.
63. In re Zouhar, 10 B.R. 154, 157 (D.N.M. 1981).
64. See DASL, 115 N.M. 591, 855 P.2d 1055.
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opinion found that the amount Dofflemeyer received from the annuities
each month did not offend the social policy of the exemption provisions,
and that his annuities provided him with no more money than necessary
to sustain his financial independence. 6 The majority opinion formulated
its holding without reference to the amount Dofflemeyer's annuities exempted, thereby overlooking the social objectives the exemption statutes
are meant to protect.
A slight spin on the facts illustrates the opinion's lack of foresight:
"X," the person attempting to use the exemption statutes, is an independently wealthy twenty-five-year-old with no dependents. X runs up a
large debt. Upon discovering she will have to dip into her savings to
pay off her debts, X purchases two annuities with most of her estate,
transferring a total of one million dollars-raised from separate sources
unrelated to any employment-into the annuities. X feels that these
annuities will be needed to provide for her retirement. If the trial court
believes X's claim that the funds are for retirement, then they are exempt.
X's only concern is to avoid the prohibitions of UFTA.66 In such a
situation it becomes clear that the analysis DASL recommends cannot
effectively prevent abuse of New Mexico's exemption provisions pursuant
to annuities.
The ad hoc decisions DASL mandates and the subjective analysis it
proposes will frustrate attorneys' ability to effectively counsel clients
contemplating bankruptcy. Theoretically, it is logical to distinguish between situations that involve intent to defraud creditors and situations
where the debtor's purpose is to acquire exempt property. However,
several problems arise in using the debtor's intent as the distinguishing
factor. Intent is especially difficult to discern when the debtor transfers
nonexempt funds into exempt funds just prior to bankruptcy. A debtor
might purchase an annuity both to protect her from economic destitution
and to prevent her creditors from garnishing those assets. Thus, the
likelihood for debtors to harbor multiple and overlapping motives further
complicates the determination of fraud. 67 This possibility, in effect, invites
the court into a potential analytical quagmire.
Lawyers and debtors should be allowed to plan for bankruptcy by
appropriate resort to exempt property. 6 However, when courts use a
"nebulous purpose test to determine the nature of the debtor's conduct,
[the court] hampers the attorney's ability to predict with certainty when
actual fraud relating to a particular conversion of nonexempt to exempt

65. Id. at 595, 855 P.2d at 1059 (Ransom, C.J., dissenting).
While Justice Ransom's dissent does not reach the conclusions this note advocates, the Chief
Justice addresses facts relevant to analyzing whether the annuities in question comport with the
purposes of the exemption statutes (i.e., Dofflemeyer's age, 77, and the way in which the income
from the annuities was a reasonable amount to assist Dofflemeyer's continued financial independence).
66. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
67. See Resnick, supra note 21, at 638.
68. "Appropriate" is used here to mean the exemption will act to fulfill the social policy of
the statutes, i.e., helping the debtor establish a new start or providing the debtor with the basic
economic necessities to ensure his dignity and financial independence.
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property will be found." 69 Uncertainty coupled with the risk that a court
will deprive the debtor of assets can result in a "chilling effect' 70 on
attorneys when advising clients. Cautious lawyers may not advise their
debtor-clients to pursue questionable exemptions, thereby exposing their
clients to an unnecessary loss of valuable assets. On the other hand,
more imprudent lawyers may see their advice lead to the embarrassment
and hardship of fraudulent transfers. Either way, the unpredictability
which shrouds the legality of transfers into exempt annuities will likely
increase legal malpractice suits against lawyers.
V.

CONCLUSION

The DASL court had the opportunity to define the annuity exemption
provisions in a manner that would make the statutes self-prohibitive of
fraud. 7' Indeed, with insightful judicial interpretation of the exemption
provisions, DASL and similar cases might never have to turn to UFTA
for answers. Yet, because the court did not limit or define the annuity
provision in the statutes, evidence that an annuity is neither life insurance
nor a retirement fund will not even serve to raise an inference of fraudulent
intent.7 2 As a result, every annuity-exemption case will be decided on an
ad hoc basis, with the decision's outcome turning upon the intent of the
debtor. It is plausible that cases like DASL will be nothing more than
swearing matches between a debtor and a creditor.
Perhaps, in the tradition of liberal construction of exemption provisions,73 the court intended for any annuity of any amount to be exempt
under section 42-10-3. In doing so, however, the New Mexico Supreme
Court not only ignored the corresponding history and purpose annuities
under section 42-10-3 share with retirement plans and life insurance, but
also the evolution of annuities from insurance-type contracts to investment
vehicles. As a result, New Mexico's generous exemption statutes remain
exposed to abuse and subject to unpredictability and confusion.

69. Resnick, supra note 21, at 643.
70. Id.
71. New Mexico's appellate courts possess the power and the opportunity to recommend legislative
reform and to add thoughtful definition to our historic laws through judicial construction. In a
recent opinion the New Mexico Court of Appeals stated:
If, as the Water Defense Association asserts, this means that we are simply superimposing twentieth-century revisionist views onto nineteenth-century history, so
be it. Legal requirements sometimes change to reflect the sensibilities of the times.
State ex rel.
Martinez v. Lewis, 116 N.M. 194, 201-02, 861 P.2d 235, 242-43 (Ct. App. 1993) (case
in continuation of the general adjudication of the Rio Hondo river system which specifically involved
the water rights of the Mescalero Apache Indian Reservation). See Schmitz v. Smentowski, 109
N.M. 386, 396, 785 P.2d 726, 736 (1990) (law changes to recognize changing circumstances of
evolving society); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 735, 497 P.2d 732, 737 (1972) (law is dynamic
and adaptable to the requirements of society at the time of its application); see also Jones v.
Harrisburg Polyclinic Hosp., 437 A.2d 1134, 1138 (Pa. 1981) (law must be responsive to new
conditions and to sense of justice and social welfare, citing Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of
the Judicial Process, 150-51 (1921)). Thus, we apply twentieth-century notions of fairness and justice
to our determination of this issue.
72. DASL, 115 N.M. at 594, 855 P.2d at 1058.
73. In re Spitz Bros., 8 N.M. 622, 635, 45 P. 1122, 1125 (1896).
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Finally, legislative action, as was done in Minnesota, can make effective
changes to prevent the abuse of New Mexico's exemption statutes. 74 The
legislature can, through minor amendments, make annuity exemptions
less susceptible to abuse and confusion. Such revisions might include
legislative amendments that would: (1) make section 42-10-3 apply only
to specific types of annuities-those annuities that have a purpose and
"character" consistent with the objectives of life insurance or retirement/
pension plans; (2) require annuities which purport to act as retirement
or pension plans be tied to employment or wages; and (3) limit the
amount an annuity under section 42-10-3 can exempt to an amount that
75
is necessary to secure the debtor's dignity and financial independence.
Limitation on the value annuities can exempt and definition as to what
types of annuities can be exempt will establish helpful guidelines to
debtors, creditors, attorneys, and courts attempting to apply the New
Mexico exemption statutes.
CERIANNE L. MULLINS

74. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
75. Of course, the last suggestion is problematic because the amount considered reasonably
necessary for financial independence will vary from person to person.

